Most of the major policy reforms being considered result in winners and losers. It would be nice if this were not so, and one could devise reforms that were "win-win" propositions when one digs beneath the public rhetoric. Unfortunately, life does not often present reforms that meet the Pareto criterion of economists that nobody be worse off after the reform than they were before it. We illustrate how one can use a quantitative model of the Danish economy to determine what reforms could be Pareto improvements if one allowed compensation of losers. †
Introduction
Most of the major policy reforms being considered result in winners and losers. It would be nice if this were not so, and one could devise reforms that were "win-win" propositions when one digs beneath the public rhetoric. Unfortunately, life does not often present reforms that meet the Pareto criterion of economists that nobody be worse off after the reform than they were before it.
We illustrate how one can use a quantitative model of the Danish economy to determine what reforms could be Pareto improvements if one allowed compensation of losers.
This approach to "policy reform without tears" is possible with a quantitative model, even if it is not possible using only theory. The reason is that one must take into account the effects of sidepayments on relative prices and hence on the basis for the welfare evaluation made prior to the sidepayments. This loop raises interminable difficulties if one does not have information on expenditure patterns of different households, as well as the rest of the structure of the economy.
One can either assume this problem away (e.g., by assuming community indifference curves or hypothetical sidepayments) or one can attempt to take it into account. We do the latter.
The way in which compensation is undertaken can also have efficiency effects. If distortionary subsidies are used to compensate losers, then there may be an efficiency cost from the very act of compensation which must also be taken into account. Thus the overall pie may be diminished by the way in which it is sliced up. Of course, it is also possible that "second best" interactions with pre-existing distortions result in an efficiency gain from the use of a distortionary compensation scheme.
In addition, the way in which the funds for compensation are raised by the government can have efficiency effects. There is a marginal excess burden from any attempt to raise extra government revenue, whether or not that revenue is being used to finance government expenditures or compensate private households. Again, second-best considerations mean that one must evaluate specific proposals to see if the marginal excess burden is positive or negative.
Compensation schemes are well known in theory, but are often neglected in practical efforts to evaluate policy reforms. We take all of the potential costs and second-best interactions from compensation into account in our calculations.
To illustrate our approach we consider the reform of excise taxes on consumption in Denmark. Our illustrative purposes will be served by using a simple, static computable general equilibrium (CGE) model we have constructed to represent the Danish economy in 1992. We use a GE model because we need to trace through the effects of changes in taxes and income on the relative prices of goods and services that households consume, both for the first-round effects of the tax reforms and for the second-round effects of the sidepayments. We use a computable GE model because we need to keep arithmetic track of the size of the welfare gains or losses that each household experiences due to the policies and sidepayments. We use a static CGE model because there is nothing essential in the logic of our illustration that requires a dynamic model, although we accept that a dynamic analysis is needed in the end to be able to propose defensible policy reforms (e.g., Jensen [2000] and Rutherford [2000] ). Finally, we use a simple, static CGE model because we do not want to have the elementary logic of our approach blurred by having too many imperfections and "ad hoc" assumptions in an effort to make the model appear to be a more realistic representation of the Danish economy. We shall see that simple does not mean small, however.
Our model is intended to be illustrative of the type of policy analysis that can be undertaken with CGE models. With obvious caveats for the current, evolving state of our model, and the confidence we place in specific numbers, we are prepared to draw four general conclusions:
C
It is feasible to evaluate the types of compensatory schemes needed to ensure that policy reforms are "win-win" reforms for all households. This is not to say that such reforms always exist, since it is possible that the aggregate pie is insufficient to effect compensation. But the Danish economy, as currently modeled here, provides many opportunities for positive reforms in this sense.
The compensation schemes are sensitive to undertaking a complete general equilibrium accounting for the "secondary" effects of the sidepayments themselves. In other words, a naïve analysis that simply drew up a list of winners and losers from some reform and effected sidepayments without checking for further effects on welfare could lead to dangerous policy. The policy would be dangerous because it would get the signs wrong (some households would be making compensation when in fact they ought to be receiving compensation) and it would get the amounts of compensation wrong (some households would receive significantly less compensation than they actually needed).
Removal of excise taxes is not as important as removing the distortions of the taxes.
Virtually all of the welfare gains from complete excise tax removal can be obtained from a policy of strict uniformity across all goods, and with none of the significant equity problems that removal entails (prior to compensation).
C Just as it is feasible to ensure that there are no losers from policy reforms, if the aggregate pie is big enough, it is also feasible to ensure that no household experience a welfare gain less than some prescribed positive threshold amount. This enables one to design policy reforms that can be "sold" to all segments of the population, rather than just to a select sub-group of winners.
A Small Open Economy Model

General Model Structure
Our Small Open Economy (SOE) model is designed for policy analysis with a large number of sectors. The model is a "generic" general equilibrium model of a single economy along the lines of Melo and Tarr [1992] , Harrison, Rutherford and Tarr [1993] and Rutherford, Rutström and Tarr [1994] . We describe here the general features of the base model, adding details about the version for Denmark below. Similarly, it provides lump sum subsidies for any increase in revenue due to a counter-factual scenario.
Since private consumption equals income from primary factors plus net transfers to consumers by the government, Walras law is satisfied. Changes in public consumption are balanced with endogenous changes in revenue, so that the public deficit in the base year is effectively exogenous. It is not zero, but constant, so that it is the change in the public deficit that is held zero.
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World market import and export prices are fixed, so there are no endogenous changes in the terms of trade. In other words, import supplies and export demands are infinitely elastic at given world prices. The current account imbalance in the base year is assumed to be matched by an exogenous capital inflow or outflow. These capital flows have no effect on the stock of domestic capital, nor on interest payments to foreigners. Domestic prices change to ensure that 3 With respect to the use of a priori judgements, our belief is that it is much easier to apply serious priors to detailed sectors than it is to synthetic aggregates. In any event, if the priors in question are essentially held in a diffuse manner over a range of sectors, then nothing is lost if one so applies them in our dis-aggregated model. Providing the reader knows when such uniform assumptions are being applied, and is not dazzled by the fake detail of the analysis, it is foolish to "hardwire" in the level of application of priors by aggregation. The primary argument for aggregation, given the ready availability of powerful software and hardware for these models, has to do with the "reliability" of data and priors at the proposed level of aggregation. Several of the data items required for our analysis are only available at an aggregated level of about 20 or 30 sectors, although far fewer than one would think. Aggregation is, however, likely to become important and appropriate as one moves to explicit inter-temporal models because of the computational burden of solving models with too many sectors.
-5-the change in the current account is zero. The fixed world prices that Denmark is assumed to face may be changed parametrically.
The aggregate stock of capital in Denmark is fixed in this static model. The aggregate endowment of labor is also fixed, although we include a labor-leisure tradeoff such that the amount of that endowment which is allocated to (official) employment is endogenous. In effect we model the consumption of leisure as the decision by the private household to "buy back" some of it's own labor endowment. Hence the supply of labor to industries is endogenous, but the aggregate endowment of labor is exogenous.
Empirical Implementation of the Model
Based on 1992 input-output data for Denmark, the model identifies 117 sectors. These are listed in Table 1 , along with their model acronym. This is the level of dis-aggregation available to the public through the input-output statistics provided by Denmarks Statistics, and provides excellent detail for our purposes. It is possible to aggregate to a smaller number of sectors, but there seems little advantage in doing so in the present exercise and some potential for misleading analysis.
3 Moreover, it is always possible to assess the information loss of employing specific aggregations if the model is fully dis-aggregated, while the reverse is obviously not true.
The household dis-aggregation is based on the 1987 Household Expenditure Survey conducted by Denmarks Statistics. It provides detailed information on expenditure patterns of 7 groups of households. The households are differentiated by various characteristics, and we use the characteristic "total income" in the present analysis. These household types are defined as follows: TI1, Total household income less than 50,000 kroner; TI2, Total household income 4 Since the matter continues to be confused by commentators that should know better (e.g., Jorgenson and Wilcoxen [1995; p.176 ]), we stress that the assumption of a Leontief technology is not mandated by our use of the calibration approach to estimation, nor by computational constraints. In general we do restrict ourselves to nested-CES functions, although they can be used to represent globally regular functional forms in a locally flexible manner (see Perroni and Rutherford [1995a] [1995b]). 5 In conjunction with an assumption that the ratio of leisure to labor endowment is 0.25, this implies calibrated elasticities of substitution that vary across households. For example, these elasticities range from 1.9 for the poorest households to 0.6 for the richest households.
- Harrison, Rutherford, and Tarr [1993] which in turn derive from estimates generated for the United States by Harrison, Jones, Kimbell and Wigle [1993] . Similarly, the elasticity of substitution by consumers between domestic production and imports varies by sector. The trade elasticities assumed reflect the best econometric estimates currently available (Reinert and 6 The popular reason for using higher trade elasticities is that one can thereby avoid these effects, which are deemed unlikely a priori for a country as small in international trade terms as Denmark. Although the specification of trade elasticities that mitigate these effects is more involved than just assuming "large" or "small" values (e.g., see Harrison, Rutherford and Tarr [1996] ), these are not debates which are relevant here.
-7-Roland-Holst [1992] and Reinert and Shiells [1991] ). Although they are low in relation to elasticity estimates used in some modeling exercises (e.g., Harrison, Rutherford and Tarr [1996] [1997]), it is important to stress that they are (a) based on explicit econometric estimates, and (b) used in a model that rules out any "terms of trade effects" by assumption.
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The SOE model is generated with the GAMS/MPSGE software developed by Brooke, Kendrick and Meeraus [1992] and Rutherford [1996 Rutherford [ ][1999 . It is then solved using the PATH algorithm developed by Dirkse and Ferris [1995] . 
Reform of Excise Taxes
Consider the effects of reform of excise taxes on consumption in Denmark. These taxes are relatively distortionary, certainly in comparison to the value added tax and even to income taxes on labor. We calculate the marginal cost of funds (MCF) of the VAT at 12%, and the MCF of excise taxes at 61%. Although these estimates are sensitive to model specification, they do point to a costly excise tax system from an efficiency perspective. The MCF is defined as the percentage efficiency cost of a marginal transfer of funds from private consumers to the government using the specified tax instrument. Thus, for every 100 Danish kroner raised by the government through excise taxes, Danish consumers effectively pay 61 kroner in addition to the 100 kroner that they transfer to the government. The extra costs are not paid literally to the government, but reflect lower standards of living due to higher prices and resource mis-allocation induced by the increase in taxes.
We evaluate the effects of movements toward abolition of the excise taxes. These taxes could be abolished by simple scalar reductions applied across-the-board to the benchmark legal 7 For example, we estimate that there would be a substantial increase in the quantity of Spirits consumption, Beer consumption, and Tobacco consumption under the TC0 reform. To some Danes this would represent a reduction in their welfare, even if they do not drink alcohol or smoke: they just dislike having drunks out on the street or cancer-ridden smokers using up hospitals, and believe that these externalities are positively correlated with aggregate consumption. As a drinker or smoker I may disagree with their assessment of internal or external net costs, but that is irrelevant here.
-8-rates, and we consider 25% decrements in scenarios TC75, TC50, TC25 and TC0 respectively.
These taxes could also be abolished as distortionary wedges by making them uniform, as we do in scenario U_TC. Ignoring second-best considerations for the moment, making excise taxes uniform would remove most of their efficiency costs and would not be as dramatic a reform in some administrative respects.
Welfare Effects of Excise Tax Reductions
The detailed pattern of excise taxes at the industry level is very distortionary, and clearly "hits" luxury goods. Table 2 suggested by the average rates reported in Table 2 . There are no surprises here in these rates, apart from the general height.
The reform TC0 generates the expected changes in quantities consumed towards those goods that are relatively heavily taxed, and away from those goods that are lightly taxed. To the extent that there are external costs of increased consumption of some of these goods, we need to be precise about what our welfare measures are capturing.
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Our task here is just to display the direct economic cost of certain tax policies; a more complete analysis would try to take into account the externalities that might be generated.
The welfare effects of these scenarios on households differentiated by total income are -9-shown in Table 3 . Each column shows the welfare effects for one of the scenarios. We focus just now on the tax reduction scenarios, and examine the uniformity scenario later.
The welfare variables are the percentage change in welfare, the welfare change for the aggregate household type in billions of Danish kroner, and the welfare change for the typical household in each household type in Danish kroner. All three are needed to get an overall picture of the welfare effects of the reform. The first measure provides an index of the change in the (real) cost of living for households in each type. The second measure portrays the size of the overall pie that goes to each household type, which can be critical to see if there is enough "positive pie" created to offset the "negative pie" for household types that lose. It is quite possible that some households experience a large welfare gain in percentage terms, but that they account for so little of the overall pie that their gains are insufficient to compensate the losers. This is what the second welfare measure allows one to determine quickly. The third measure relates the actual changes to some easily understood level, the individual household and Danish kroner.
All welfare changes refer to annual changes that are recurring in the absence of any other change in the economy.
Finally, we show the same three welfare change measures in aggregate form. All that we do here is aggregate over the households listed. Although one could interpret these as measures from a Classical Utilitarian Social Welfare Function (SWF), we prefer to just think of them as summary measures of overall change. Given our focus on the size of the overall pie, in anticipation of the need to effect sidepayments, we are particularly interested in the sign of these measures.
Turning to the specific results in Table 3 , there are some clear winners and losers. The scalar-reduction reforms generate substantial welfare losses for the poorest households (TI1, TI2 and TI3). Welfare losses decrease, and welfare benefits increase, with household income. The biggest winners from these reforms are the richest households, who each stand to gain as much as 77,772 kroner per year from the abolition of excise taxes.
It appears that the aggregate pie is also likely to be large enough that the winners can compensate the losers. The richest household gains more than enough (11.35 billion kroner) by itself to compensate all of the losers (who lose 1.74+5.56+3.65 = 10.95 billion kroner), if we ignore general equilibrium effects of those sidepayments. The overall picture that emerges from these equity effects is that the excise taxes do appear to be very progressive in incidence.
Welfare Effects of Excise Tax Uniformity
The most important feature of the U_TC scenario, for present purposes, is that it generates substantial welfare gains for virtually all household types. Although some distributional effects persist, they are of an order of magnitude less than when we abolish excise taxes.
Contrast the U_TC and TC0 scenarios in terms of the effects on sectoral consumption in Table 2 . By and large the changes are identical in U_TC and TC0, reflecting the fact that we are primarily seeing substitution effects at work here. That is, the TC0 scenario can be viewed as both reducing the overall level of excise taxes and making them more uniform. The U_TC scenario just does the latter. The fact that they generate almost the same quantity changes indicates that it is the uniformity of excise taxes that is driving these sectoral results, in conjunction with the low MEB of the VAT.
Compensating Losers
For the excise tax reduction scenarios there appears to be a serious problem recommending policy reform if we stick to the simple application of the Pareto criterion to the results in Table 3 . Since some households lose, and the losses appear to be quite significant in percentage and absolute terms, the reforms could not be advocated using that criterion.
One alternative is to extend the applicability of the criterion so as to allow sidepayments to losers be a part of the reform. We calculate the smallest set of sidepayments such that no household lose, taking into account the effects of these sidepayments on the underlying general equilibrium.
The results are shown in Table 4 , and contain some surprises. The first "result," in a sense, is that we are able to compute these solutions at all! This might appear to be stating the obvious, but it is noteworthy since we are only aware of one other policy analysis that implements 8 Due to Harrison, Rutherford and Wooton [1995] .
-11-such calculations.
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The second result is that the naïve expectations of who should compensate whom would be qualitatively wrong. Consider scenario TC0 to be specific. Those expectations from Table 3 might have been that households TI4, TI5, TI6 and TI7 would have been making sidepayments, and that only households TI1, TI2 and TI3 would need to receive them. In fact household TI4 ends up having to receive sidepayments as well, rather than making them. The reason is that the general equilibrium effects of the changes in income occasioned by the "initial" round of sidepayments affect welfare. Hence the qualitative pattern of compensations is different when one takes into account the real effects of effecting them.
The third result is that the quantitative size of the compensation amounts differs from the naïve analysis. From Table 3 one might be tempted to conclude that households in the TI1, TI2
and TI3 groups would need to receive 10.95 billion kroner in compenation. In fact, the amounts required from panel E of Table 4 are calculated to be much larger: 2.3 + 8.1 + 7.5 + 0.6 =18.5 billion korner. Thus a naïve analysis that ignored the general equilibrium effects would dramatically understate the required amounts of compensation, and would in fact leave some losers from the reform. Again, the reason for the difference is that our CGE analysis takes into account the real effects of actually making the sidepayments.
Can Everyone Win?
Without delving into the psychology of voters or politicians too deeply, it is apparent that it would be desirable to be able to design policy reforms in which all households gained something, rather than just being non-losers. That is, can we design compensation schemes such that each household is guaranteed to get a certain positive threshold gain in welfare? This question is, of course, just a logical extension of the previous compensation exercises where the minimum threshold is positive rather than zero. Hence the same common-sense caveats apply:
such compensation assumes that the underlying reform generates enough aggregate pie to enable sidepayments to be undertaken without diminishing the "goose laying the golden egg." 9 We calculate that the average Danish household gains by 10,147 kroner per year when the Pareto criterion is applied to ensure that no household loses, and that the gain is only 10,168 kroner per year when the criterion is applied to ensure that no household gain less than 1% in welfare terms. Hence the difference is 21 = 10,147 -10,168 per year.
-12-To illustrate the feasibility of this extension, we considered the TC0 scenario again. As we constrain each household to receive a specified positive percentage welfare gain, ranging from 1% up to 3% in increments of 1%, we find that aggregate welfare is reduced. The average Danish household gives up 21 kroner per year 9 to ensure that all households gain by at least 1%, and this cost grows to 42 kroner and 54 kroner per year to ensure welfare gains of 2% and 3%, respectively. However, this is just the price tag for undertaking a policy reform that is more likely to be accepted by all parties. In other words, there is a political trade-off between efficiency and equity which translates into less-efficient reforms having a greater chance of being politically palatable since they are more equitable.
The winners of some initial reform package, in which there are losers, face a simple choice. Either push for the original reform (with a relatively high payoff but a relatively low probability of acceptance) or accept a modified reform package that effects compensation (and hence offers a lower payoff but with a higher probability of acceptance). Our task is to guide citizens in making these trade-offs by indicating the amounts of compensation that would be required, and the reduction in payoffs associated with that modification.
Extensions
For the purposes of offering specific policy recommendations in Denmark, there are many possible extensions to our underlying model. These extensions are, however, not important for the general methodological point we are making here.
Two extensions are, however, germane to the simple point we are making here about the feasibility of designing policy reforms without tears. One has to do with the willingness of households to share their potential welfare gains, and the other has to do with the costliness of effecting sidepayments.
10 This 100% refers to the simulations in which we required that no household lose. The percentage would be less than 100% for the simulations in which we require that each household have a positive welfare gain, of course.
-13-
Willingness to Compensate
An extension of our present approach is to recognize that some households might be more willing than others to undertake compensation if needed. We have implicitly assumed here that any household would be willing to transfer up to 100% of it's welfare gain in order to effect sidepayments.
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One could use survey methods to elicit the ex ante willingness of each household to effect compensation if necessary for policy reform. Specifically, consider a question of the following form: "If you were to gain from this policy reform, what percentage of your gains would you be willing to give up each year to compensate losers from the reforms?" Why would households ever reveal some positive percentage? Because they would realize, and we would tell them in the survey, that in the absence of sufficient compensation it is possible that the reforms would be politically infeasible. Households would be told that we would not take any greater percentage than they specified, so there would be no chance that they would lose from the reform, at least to the extent that they are correctly represented in the model.
This extension raises the possibility of strategic misrepresentations from households when confronted with the possibility that their response could affect the extent of their consumer surplus. This issue has been neglected in the older welfare economics literature on the use of the compensation criteria, probably because of a belief that the criteria suffered from other more serious problems (e.g., inconsistency, and indeterminacy if compensation were actually effected). Hammond and Sempere [1995] consider the problem, but only by way of a critique of casual attempts to infer sidepayments necessary for policy reform "without tears". This type of strategic misrepresentation is a general one facing surveys of this kind, and techniques for dealing with it have been proposed (e.g., see Blackburn, Harrison and Rutström [1994] ). We are optimistic that this problem can be solved, or at least mitigated, but it remains an open one for future investigation.
Once elicited, and assuming them to be true reports, these percentages would be used to constrain further the computation of sidepayments. Since that calculation assumed these percentages to be up to 100% for each and every household, as noted above, we would just add in these constraints as a tightening of the sidepayments constraints applying to each household type.
Of course, this could make the possibility of Pareto-ensuring side-payments infeasible, but that would likely be a signal that the reform may also be politically infeasible.
The Leaky Bucket
We model the compensations from winners to losers by having the government agent make lump-sum sidepayments to losers and collect extra revenues from all households in a lumpsum manner. Since some households receive, on balance, more from the government than they pay, we are in effect transferring income from winners to losers.
It is possible that if the government does not have access to a lump-sum tax and subsidy instrument that it would use costly instruments to redistribute income. In other words, it is possible that the simple act of merely transferring one kroner amongst private households could impose some efficiency costs (see Ballard [1988] ).
These costs could arise on the "taking" end, as the government uses a distortionary tax instrument to raise revenues, and/or it could occur on the "giving" end as the government uses a distortionary subsidy instrument to disburse the revenues. Of course, second best considerations could result in these instruments generating efficiency gains even if they are distortionary in a partial equilibrium sense. To illustrate the nature of the problem, imagine that the government used the VAT to raise the revenues needed for these compensations. We know that there is a positive MEB from this use of the VAT, so the aggregate pie would likely be smaller due to the very act of redistribution. In the public finance literature this is referred to as "Okun's leaky bucket," to reflect the idea that just carrying water from one household to another may result in the loss of some water for all. An evaluation of the feasibility of policy reform without tears in Denmark must take into account the leaks in the Danish welfare state bucket. Total household income more than 500 000 kr A. Hicksian equivalent variation (%) TC75 TC50 TC25 TC0 U_TC ---------------------------------------------------------------TI1 -5. TC75  TC50  TC25  TC0  U_TC  - TC75  TC50  TC25  TC0  U_TC  - TI1  -3292  -7357  -12615  -20277  462  TI2  -2163  -4950  -8715  -14513  2086  TI3  -796  -1990  -3819  -7046  3513  TI4  2113  4199  6190  7674  7345  TI5  5122  10639  16694  23342  10989  TI6  8333  17419  27525  38907  14049  TI7  15889  33594  53819  77772 TC75  TC50  TC25  TC0 U_TC ----------------------------------------------------------------------- 
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